

COVID Worker Value Functions

We extend on the pre-COVID design with the following value functions for employed and unemployed respectively:

$$U_t = b + \beta[p(\theta_{t+1})E_{t+1} + (1 - p(\theta_{t+1}))U_{t+1}]$$

$$E_t = w + \beta[\delta(1 - p(\theta_{t+1}))U_{t+1} + (1 - \delta)(1 - p(\theta_{t+1})))E_{t+1}]$$

Adding SIR-model transitions ($\pi, \iota\pi, \gamma^R, \gamma^D$ stand for employed infection, unemployed infection, recovery, and death rates respectively):

$$U_t^S = b + \beta[\iota\pi_t U_{t+1}^I + (1 - \iota\pi_t)(p(\theta_{t+1})E_{t+1}^S + (1 - p(\theta_{t+1}))U_{t+1}^S)]$$

$$U_t^I = b + \beta[(1 - \gamma^R - \gamma^D)U_{t+1}^I + \gamma^R(p(\theta_{t+1})E_{t+1}^R + (1 - p(\theta_{t+1}))U_{t+1}^R)]$$

$$U_t^R = b + \beta[p(\theta_{t+1})E_{t+1}^R + (1 - p(\theta_{t+1}))U_{t+1}^R]$$

$$E_t^S = w_t + \beta[\pi_t(\delta U_{t+1}^I + (1 - \delta)E_{t+1}^I) + (1 - \pi_t)(\delta(1 - p(\theta_{t+1}))U_{t+1}^S + (1 - \delta)(1 - p(\theta_{t+1})))E_{t+1}^S]$$

$$E_t^I = w_t + \beta[(1 - \gamma^R - \gamma^D)(\delta U_{t+1}^I + (1 - \delta)E_{t+1}^I) + \gamma^R(\delta(1 - p(\theta_{t+1}))U_{t+1}^R + (1 - \delta)(1 - p(\theta_{t+1})))E_{t+1}^R]$$

$$E_t^R = w_t + \beta[\delta(1 - p(\theta_{t+1}))U_{t+1}^R + (1 - \delta)(1 - p(\theta_{t+1})))E_{t+1}^R]$$

COVID Firm Behaviour

The pre-COVID firm decision was to choose $\{e_t, v_t\}_{t=0}^\infty$ in order to maximise

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t (y_t - w_t e_t - \kappa v_t)$$

$$s.t. \quad y_t = A_t n_t^s, \quad n_t = q(\theta_t)v_t + (1 - \delta)n_{t-1}.$$

The resulted in the F.O.C.

$$\frac{\kappa}{q(\theta_t)} = s \frac{y_t}{n_t} - w_t + \beta(1 - \delta) \frac{\kappa}{q(\theta_{t+1})}$$

Adding SIR-model transitions, firms choose $\{e_t, v_t\}_{t=0}^\infty$ in order to maximise

$$\begin{aligned} & \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left\{ -w_t e_t - \kappa v_t + (1-\phi) y_t + \phi(1-\pi)^t y_t + \phi \eta y_t \sum_{j=0}^{t-1} [(1-\pi)^j \pi (1-\gamma^R - \gamma^D)^{t-j-1}] + \right. \\ & \quad \left. \phi y_t \sum_{j=0}^{t-1} \sum_{k=2}^{t-j} [(1-\pi)^j \pi (1-\gamma^R - \gamma^D)^{t-j-k} \gamma^R] \right\} \text{ s.t. } \\ & y_t = A_t n_t^s, \quad n_t = q(\theta_t) v_t + (1-\delta)(1-\phi) \sum_{j=0}^{t-1} \sum_{k=2}^{t-j} [(1-\pi)^j \pi (1-\gamma^R - \gamma^D)^{t-j-k} \gamma^D] n_{t-1}. \end{aligned}$$

Equivalently, the firms choose $\{e_t\}_{t=0}^\infty$ in order to maximise

$$\begin{aligned} & \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left\{ A_t n_t^s [(1-\phi) + \phi(1-\pi)^t + \phi \eta \sum_{j=0}^{t-1} [(1-\pi)^j \pi (1-\gamma^R - \gamma^D)^{t-j-1}]] + \right. \\ & \quad \left. \phi \sum_{j=0}^{t-1} \sum_{k=2}^{t-j} [(1-\pi)^j \pi (1-\gamma^R - \gamma^D)^{t-j-k} \gamma^R]] - w_t n_t - \right. \\ & \quad \left. \frac{\kappa}{q(\theta_t)} [n_t - (1-\delta)(1-\phi) \sum_{j=0}^{t-1} \sum_{k=2}^{t-j} [(1-\pi)^j \pi (1-\gamma^R - \gamma^D)^{t-j-k} \gamma^D] n_{t-1}] \right\}. \end{aligned}$$

The F.O.C. reads:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\kappa}{q(\theta_t)} = & s \frac{y_t}{n_t} \left\{ (1-\phi) + \phi(1-\pi)^t + \phi \eta \sum_{j=0}^{t-1} [(1-\pi)^j \pi (1-\gamma^R - \gamma^D)^{t-j-1}] + \right. \\ & \phi \sum_{j=0}^{t-1} \sum_{k=2}^{t-j} [(1-\pi)^j \pi (1-\gamma^R - \gamma^D)^{t-j-k} \gamma^R] - w_t + \\ & \left. \beta(1-\delta)(1-\phi) \sum_{j=0}^t \sum_{k=2}^{t-j+1} [(1-\pi)^j \pi (1-\gamma^R - \gamma^D)^{t-j-k} \gamma^D] \right\} \frac{\kappa}{q(\theta_{t+1})} \end{aligned}$$

In order to be able to simulate the COVID equilibrium, we require either a recursive representation of the F.O.C. or to rewrite the system using value functions:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\kappa}{q(\theta_t)} &= \phi J_t^S + (1-\phi) J_t^R \\ J_t^S &= -w_t + (1-\pi_t) \left(s \frac{y_t}{n_t} + \beta(1-\delta) J_{t+1}^S \right) + \pi_t \left(s \frac{\eta y_t}{n_t} + \beta(1-\delta)(1-\gamma^D) J_{t+1}^I \right) \\ J_t^I &= -w_t + (1-\gamma^R - \gamma^D) \left(s \frac{\eta y_t}{n_t} + \beta(1-\delta)(1-\gamma^D) J_{t+1}^I \right) + \gamma^R \left(s \frac{y_t}{n_t} + \beta(1-\delta) J_{t+1}^R \right) \\ J_t^R &= -w_t + s \frac{y_t}{n_t} + \beta(1-\delta) J_{t+1}^R \end{aligned}$$